leaders of tomorrow must master tactical, operational and strategic competencies to address a much larger scope of contingencies at a much earlier point in their military careers to include a greater focus on non-kinetic issues such as culture, socio-economics and politics. However, our current formal system of Professional Military Education (PME) continues to try and meet these growing requirements within a framework whose scope has changed little in the past twenty years. In order to prepare our future officers to become "pentathletes" in the future strategic environment, there are significant modifications that need to be considered for the existing PME continuum. These "pentathlete" competencies that teach officers "how to think" vice "what to think" need to be introduced early during the pre-commissioning process and then reinforced through a Continuing Officer Education System (COES) that supports leadership development at formalized schools within the institutional domain and while serving in unit assignments within the operational and self development domains throughout an officer's career, thus enabling life long learning.
ii PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE "PENTATHLETE" OF THE Prior to and during the advance through the deserts of Iraq, Chris had studied the Koran and had read several books on Mohammed the prophet and understood the concept of Jihad and used this knowledge during the campaign. After routing Sadaam's forces in Najaf, the Grand Ayatollah Sistani wanted do speak to the American Commander to arrange for protection. LTC Hughes had studied the Ayatollah's teachings and sent a note to the Ayatollah with carefully selected words. The Ayatollah was impressed and invited the American to meet with him. To get to the Ayatollah's location, LTC Hughes would have to traverse the heart of the city and go near the holiest Shi'a location in the country. He knew the visit would be a sensitive issue and so he organized a force of 130 soldiers, not to large but sufficient enough for self protection. Upon nearing the Mosque, insurgents began spreading the word that the Americans were there to harm the Ayatollah and the crowd began to become hostile. LTC Hughes could have easily suppressed the crowd with force, but instead he used his own critical reasoning and determined it was a misunderstanding and made the decision to withdrawal or as he stated it "they defused the confused." He told his troops to smile, take a knee and point their weapons down at the dirt. He instructed his soldiers to take digital photos of those in the crowd who were not smiling and then told his troops to withdraw. Upon departing he "demonstratively swung his right arm and placed his hand flat against his heart in the traditional Islamic gesture, Peace be with you." He added, "Have a nice day" then he walked off. Later that evening he sent a force back into town and took out the problem makers that had stirred up the crowd earlier in the day.
He later met with Ayatollah Sistani who issued a fatwa ordering all Shi'as not to interfere with his force. 1 His leadership was the decisive factor for successfully accomplishing the mission and protecting his force.
"Leadership is influencing people by providing purpose, direction and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization." 2 Like previous successful leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hughes is a master in combat leadership. However, it is his skills that he developed above and beyond his warfighting expertise that made him an effective leader in Iraq. LTC Hughes epitomizes the traits needed for the current strategic environment.
The Army calls such leaders "pentathletes" -leaders who are not only warriors but are culturally aware, skilled in governance, and able to operate across the full spectrum of conflict in the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment of today. The current Professional
Military Education (PME) system is not optimally structured to prepare the Army's leaders for the 21 st century environment.
Leadership in the New Strategic Environment
The strategic environment of today is significantly different from the strategic landscape of just a few years ago. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols phase 1 report emphasizes this point:
At the time of Goldwater-Nichols, the United States was engaged in a very dangerous, but somewhat predictable, competition with the Soviet Union. Leadership is the most dynamic element of combat power. As an institution, the Army is universally recognized for its ability to produce exceptional leaders. The issue however, is whether the current education system is structured properly to keep pace with the new strategic environment. "Both current and past senior civilian defense officials reportedly have grown increasingly frustrated with the conventional mindset of many strategic-level military officers." 6 In their view, too many senior leaders are too cautious, lacking the "fresh thinking, creativity, and ingenuity" to engage in the "out-of-the-box" thinking required to fully understand the asymmetric threats posed by new strategic environment. The current education system is very effective in training officers "what to think" but is not nearly as effective in educating officers "how to think "
To improve the officer education system, developing leadership competencies that address "how to think" must be part of the solution. General Shelton stated "our military leaders must be schooled in matters both military and political -they must also be masters of the geopolitical realm." He added "these stringent requirements for our future military leaders mean we must educate them on a wide range of subjects over a period of years throughout their 12 The Strategic
Studies Institute recognized the list of requirements was becoming unmanageable and consolidated these traits in to six general metacompentencies.
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The "Pentathlete"
The profession is the application of abstract knowledge to a special situation that is unique to that profession's jurisdiction. 22 The profession of arms, just as any other profession, requires continuing education. In the new strategic environment, the expanded Army jurisdiction (peacekeeping and nation building) may have very well outrun its educational system. 23 The environment has changed and the leadership development model developed for the "Cold War" no longer applies.
Current Professional Military Education Shortcomings
The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) officer study report accurately sums up OES shortfalls:
Over the past ten years the Army's institutional training and education system has attempted to remain relevant to the Operational Environment. But the basic structure and methods within the OES have not appreciably changed. OES must adapt to meet the emerging requirements of full spectrum operations and the transforming Army. 24 In addition to not adequately addressing the competencies needed for full spectrum operations; the current system is locked in a cold war mentality focusing officers on the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war independently from one another and in a sequential pattern.
In addition to the institutional domain not being able to keep pace with the requirements of the current strategic reality, the other two domains have serious flaws as well. Both the operational experience and self development domains suffer from inconsistent application and lack clear guidance to tie them to the institutional domain. Under the current education system, continuing professional self development is highly encouraged, however very little incentive or resources back up this encouragement. There is no overarching continuing education policy that ties the institutional education with operational experience and personal professional development. Thus, the leadership development model and officer education system is structurally flawed, and not up to the task of developing pentathletes.
Professional Military Education Recommendations
The current Officer Education System (OES) must evolve to develop pentathletes for the changing environment. It is not only a matter of adding new competencies, it also requires a reexamination of when and where these new competencies should be mastered in an officer's career. As recent experience has shown, pentathletes with a level of strategic thinking skills are needed down at the company grade level.
To develop pentathletes, I propose four general recommendations. First, the new educational system must address the expanded pentathlete competencies without degrading core warfighting competencies. Second, the institutional pillar of the educational model must be protected from further degradation and better synchronized with the operational Army. Third, the educational system must be better integrated within the framework of a continuing traditional POI, such as battalion staff processes, to a distance learning forum within the operational domain must be made to accommodate time to some critical pentathlete competencies. Other pentathlete competencies such as governance, statesmanship, diplomacy, cultural awareness and adaptive thinking can be taught through alternative forums outside of institutional education. For most of these new competencies, they will need to be continually reinforced as it will take years before leaders reach the level of competence desired.
Preserve Institutional Education
The anchor of the officer development model is the institutional domain. Educational institutions provide time for reflection and rejuvenation -an important aspect of developing intellectual capacity. The civilian professional world has known this for years and has programs for sending their people on sabbaticals to reflect, improve family relationships, and recharge.
This rejuvenation process is instrumental to retaining high quality talent and infusing intellectual thought into the organization. Despite acknowledgement of its importance, there is continuing pressure to compress institutional time. For many, reducing time away from the operational Army is a valid means to save costs. However, as Colonel Rowan points out, we must not transition to a system where our career schools become "academic ranger schools," which risks even greater junior-officer retention problems in the name of efficiency and cost effectiveness. 25 Time spent at these institutions is akin to sabbatical time in the civilian professional world. The
Army must, at a minimum, protect the institutional education time of the current system and find innovative ways to develop expanded pentathlete competencies.
One approach within the institutional domain is to encourage officers to complete a graduate degree in a field that benefits the Army and enhances pentathlete development.
Civilian universities provide superb intellectual environments for developing many pentathlete competencies such as cultural awareness and governance. McCousland and Martin proposed that the Army consider offering a leave of absence at partial pay in order for officers to pursue an advanced degree. At the end of the leave of absence the officer returns to the Army, but joins a later year group. 26 An additional recommendation would be to increase the pay back time to the Army to discourage civilian corporations from recruiting these officers after the Army The continuing education model must be prescriptive and require the officer to achieve certain requirements at certain points in his or her career. Incentives and penalties for not meeting certain educational gates should be considered to motivate and ensure officers stay on track.
For example, if an officer does not obtain the necessary continuing education credits, they would not become eligible for promotion to the next grade. Concepts such as bonuses and or greater assignment opportunities could also be considered.
Transitioning to a COES like model was not feasible previously because the appropriate tools and time within the operational domain were not available. A key component to COES is the availability now of online distance learning tools for routine classes like battalion staff operations or an introduction to joint operations that can be used to tailor officer education while an officer is serving in his or her unit. For example, rather than trying to cover the details on all aspects of battalion staff processes for every officer, which is currently part of the institutional program of instruction, an officer can take an overview class on the battalion staff and then take detailed classes to cover the particular staff function they must perform. force, direct supervision is primarily in the realm of the NCO corps. While it is still important to manage the multitude of administrative requirements, it is reasonable to expect that two to three times a week, the officers could attend classes supporting officer educational requirements.
These classes could be conducted either within a unit environment or at post centers, or a combination of both. For instance, classes focusing on unit related requirements such as regional awareness for an upcoming deployment might be best taught in small groups formed at the battalion level and facilitated by trained personnel from the post education center.
This method would maximize the benefits of small group instruction as well as improving unit team building. The classes could be tailored around projected unit deployments to enhance the cultural awareness or particular national strategy issues associated with the deployment location. Other classes might be best taken at the individual level to address the particular needs of the officer based on their grade and where they are in meeting the educational Officers that have completed JPME I prior to ILE, should be given the opportunity to gain JPME II credit at ILE. offer all the courses needed. These considerations will need to be considered in the process of modifying the existing pre-commissioning POI within ROTC and the military academy. Another concern will be the changes to the programs of instruction. There should be great concern that critical warfighting skills will be diminished by the addition of new non-warfighting competencies.
Careful attention to this issue will require significant effort with constant re-evaluation of all PME programs of instruction to guard against this very potential. Finally, without the proper incentives, new additional online continuing educational requirements could be viewed very negatively by the junior officer corps.
Many leaders question the need for institutional PME during wartime, let alone any modification of the educational system. With many headquarters and units short qualified officers in the field, it seems counterproductive to many to sacrifice needed manpower to attend schooling while trying to prosecute a war. Lessons from the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s as well as the aftermath of World War II illustrate the importance of continuing PME during wartime. The intellectual investment to PME during the interwar period created a cohort of strategic leaders who were extremely well equipped to prosecute a global war. However, during that very same war, the majors and lieutenant colonels who fought the war did not receive education at the general staff or war college level that would have greatly assisted in preparing them for strategic senior leadership positions. Those same leaders faced very different conditions during the Viet Nam war when they were the senior strategic leaders in charge and, from my perspective, could have greatly benefited from the strategic tools they would have otherwise received from a good PME program. Therefore, it is not only wise to maintain a vigorous PME during both peacetime and wartime, it is essential that our best leaders receive this critical education.
The COES model will produce the pentathletes desired by the Army leadership.
However, there are costs associated with producing these pentathletes as outlined in this paper.
The majority of these costs are associated with the operational domain. First, TRADOC will need funding to develop and manage the operational COES modules to support installation and on-line education that currently does not exist. Additionally, TRADOC will need to synchronize this training with institutional domain. Finally, installation education centers will need to be funded to manage and execute those operational COES modules taught on the installations.
Conclusion
The strategic environment has dramatically changed, however leadership remains the most dynamic element of combat power. Army leaders must remain masters of warfighting but must also expand that expertise to address the full spectrum of operations within an environment that compresses and blurs the lines between the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Leaders of tomorrow must become pentathletes, mastering strategic concepts at a much earlier point in their careers to include a greater focus on the broader, more complex, politicomilitary arena.
The current professional military education system and leadership development model is not adequately structured to develop Army pentathlete leaders and the officer education system must be modified. The answer is not to significantly expand institutional training but rather better leverage the operational and self development domains of the leader development model.
By the same token, institutional educational must be protected from further degradation and be better synchronized to include introducing the pentathlete competencies early during the precommissioning process and then reinforcing them through a Continuing Officer Education System (COES), thus enabling life long learning. Institutional education must be synchronized with well defined officer education within the operational domain by leveraging the new ARFORGEN model.
Such a Continuing
Officer Education System will go a long way to creating the "pentathletes we need to meet the demands of the new strategic environment we now find ourselves in. Renovating our officer education system is critical to the effectiveness of the future force. Former Chairman of the Joint Staff, General Hugh Shelton sums it up well:
To put is simply, we must provide our future leaders with the best possible education in the military art, and other related fields, to make certain America retains its pre-eminence on tomorrow's battlefields. This investment in educating our people and building future leaders (read pentathletes) is crucial to meeting our future security requirements. It is an investment we must not fail to make. 
